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Abstract
This article aims to analyze the transformations produced in the field of migra-
tion control policies in the recent Argentine context. The notion of “politics 
of hostility” is proposed to characterize a specific mode of political interven-
tion based on the spectacularization, expansion and intensification of migration 
control. It is argued that the main changes are related to the reconfiguration 
of the control regime of migrant “illegality” that has taken place through spe-
cific interventions on detention, deportation and border rejection. Based on 
a qualitative methodology that articulates participant observation, interviews, 
and diverse documentary sources, different processes, scenes, events, inter-
ventions, and conflicts specifically related to detention, deportation, and bor-
der rejection are analyzed. In addition, special attention is given to the emer-
gence of new spatialities and temporalities of migration and border control.
Keywords: migration, borders, control, Argentina, deportation, politics of hos-
tility.
Resumen
Este artículo tiene como objetivo analizar las transformaciones producidas en 
el campo de las políticas de control migratorio en el contexto argentino re-
ciente. Se propone la noción de “política de la hostilidad” para caracterizar un 
modo específico de intervención política basado en la espectacularización, la 
expansión y la intensificación del control de las migraciones. Se sostiene que 
los principales cambios están relacionados con la reconfiguración del régimen 
de control de la “ilegalidad” migrante que ha tenido lugar a partir de inter-
venciones específicas sobre la detención, la expulsión y el rechazo en frontera. 
Con base en una metodología cualitativa que articula observación participan-
te, entrevistas y diversas fuentes documentales, se analizan procesos, escenas, 
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acontecimientos, intervenciones y conflictos vinculados específicamente con la deten-
ción, la expulsión y el rechazo en frontera. El análisis presta especial atención a la emer-
gencia de nuevas espacialidades y temporalidades del control migratorio y fronterizo.
Palabras clave: migraciones, fronteras, control, Argentina, deportación, política de la 
hostilidad.
Introduction
During the last decade, after the first migratory reforms carried out by some national 
governments recognized as “progressive” or “post-neoliberal” and after various 
efforts at constructing regional consensuses around migration, there was a significant 
reconfiguration in the field of South American migration policies. Thus, in a regional 
context with important mutations in migration movements and a changing political 
stage due to the coming to power of parties or coalitions of a “new right”, the expansion 
and intensification of migration and border control were expressed through the 
increase of state violence toward migrants and the proliferation of punitive and 
repressive practices under new justifying narratives. This article aims to analyze the 
transformations produced in migration control policies in the current Argentinian 
context. I maintain that the main changes experienced in migration control relate 
to the reconfiguration of the control regime of migrant “illegality”, which took place 
through specific interventions on detention, deportation, and rejection at the border. 
Furthermore, I suggest that in the framework of an official strategy of spectacularization 
of migration control, which is part of a process of criminalization and securitization of 
migration with a scope that goes beyond Argentina, the detention, deportation, and 
border rejection practices acquired an unusual preeminence, establishing multiple 
disputes with organizations and groups that historically or occasionally act in defense 
of migrants.
Based on the proposed “politics of hostility1”, I also seek to account for the 
expansion and intensification of migration control in the Argentinian context. These 
processes relate to events that reorganized the struggles around the migration issue, 
which contributed decisively to establishing a politics of deportation. There were 
two crucial government measures in this direction: creating a detention center for 
migrants in an administrative “irregular” situation and a decree focused on the concept 
of deportation. Rejections at the border also played an essential role in producing 
unrest among some migrant collectives, although they did not cause significant 
confrontations between migration authorities and migrant rights organizations. I also 
explore and analyze the spatial-temporal dimension involved in the migration control 
expansion and intensification processes and policies. Therefore, I suggest that the 
transformation of the control regime of migrant “illegality” took on new spatialities 
1 Without an exhaustive development, I have previously used the notion of a “politics of hostility” in Dome-
nech (2019) and París, Domenech, and Bélanger (2020).
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and temporalities of control in the Argentinian context. By investigating some of 
the forms that the exercise of control takes, I intend to indicate that, although the 
intensification of migration and border control is a question of magnitude, it is not 
only in quantitative terms. It is about the diversification and multiplication of specific 
control practices, executed on different spatial scales and variable time intervals. In 
order to develop these suppositions, the article is organized as follows: the first section 
provides some theoretical and methodological details on securitization, illegality, 
and hostility; the second section describes in general terms the “politics of hostility” 
toward migrants in the Argentinian national context; the subsequent three sections 
reconstruct and analyze some processes, stages, events, actions, and conflicts related 
to detention, deportation, and border rejection to shed some light on the most recent 
transformations in the field of migration control policies. The last section provides 
some final considerations on the findings of this article.
Securitization, Illegality and Hostility
In recent years, the notion of securitization has been widely used to explain some 
of the changes in migration policies in the South American context, particularly 
those national experiences that illustrate an intensification of migration and border 
control and state violence against migrants.Hence, it is common to find references to 
migration criminalization processes and to tighten border controls and, in some cases, 
to their link with a notion of “security” generally labeled as national. Although this 
article does not explicitly scrutinize the migration securitization process in Argentina, 
the analysis of certain control practices necessarily refers to this concept. The category 
of “politics of hostility” is linked to the way the (in)securitization of migration occurs 
(Bigo, 2002). The approach here to the notion of securitization is based on some 
central propositions of critical studies of security (Balzacq et al., 2010; Bigo, 2002; 
Bigo & McCluskey, 2018; Huysmans & Squire, 2009). Thus, discourses, practices, or 
representations without a punitive or repressive connotation are also assumed as 
part of the production of (in)securitization. The attention to securitization in these 
terms assumes other spatialities and temporalities in analyzing migration and border 
policies and practices. For this reason, I avoid using the criterion of spatial-temporal 
delimitation of the chronological periods imposed by the succession of governmental 
administrations or making interpretations in terms of continuities and ruptures in 
specific periods. Instead, I am more inclined to apprehend the different spatialities 
and temporalities of migration control policies and practices.
The exploration of migration control policies and practices developed in this 
article follows the critical theoretical-methodological approaches that propose the 
concept of regime for studying migration and borders (Hess, 2012; Hess & Kasparek, 
2017; Sciortino, 2004; Tsianos & Karakayali, 2010). Thus, from the perspective of 
critical migration and border studies, the concept of regime refers to a space of 
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conflict, negotiation, and resistance to movement control. This article starts from the 
premise that migration policies were, and are, constituted around the tension between 
the control and freedom of movement in specific national frameworks that are part 
of international mobility regulation processes. Together with the contributions of the 
view of autonomy of migration, the notion of regime makes it possible to challenge 
those approaches in the study of migration policy that view migration from a sedentary 
conception, which reproduce the perspective of the so-called receiving society. On 
the other hand, the notion of regime allows for the incorporation of a multiplicity 
of actors, whose practices are related but not organized according to a central logic 
or rationality, that is, it makes it possible to understand regulation as an effect of 
social practices (Hess, 2012). Similarly, the concept also leaves room for interstices, 
ambiguities, and tensions: a regime is the result of constant repair work through 
practices (Sciortino, 2004).
From this perspective, migrant struggles (De Genova et al., 2015) are also 
constitutive of migration policies. They are not just responses or reactions to the 
official policies or any new form of migration regulation; they actively participate 
in their configuration. In tune with the propositions of the autonomy of migration, 
I understand that migration policies are shaped and organized based on how they 
are challenged by the multiple forms and continuous transformations that migration 
movements acquire, and the diverse struggles triggered by the search for control. Here, 
I pick up again the notion of an “illegal” migration control regime, used previously 
to analyze the historical production of the “illegal migrant” figure in Argentina 
(Domenech, 2011). This regime includes practices of control of those mobilities that 
do not respond to state parameters (e.g., those that infringe migration laws or that 
do not follow the technocratic formula of “secure, orderly, and regular migration”), 
as well as regulation practices of diverse character (punitive, repressive, assistential, 
humanitarian) explicitly related to detention, deportation and deportability, border 
rejection, regularization, and “voluntary assisted return”, among other possibilities. 
Similarly, it can include practices of negotiation and response to control such as 
struggles for documentation, denunciations of human rights violations, legal defense 
of migrant rights, mobilizations against detentions and deportations, and “struggles 
for movement”,2 among others.
This article proposes the notion of a politics of hostility to give an account of a 
dominant form that the power relationship acquires from the disputes that various 
actors in the field of migration and borders maintain and the specific forms the 
exercise of migration control takes. A politics of hostility is not limited, nor does it 
necessarily have to coincide with a period of government; it can precede it, exceed 
it, or determine a moment of varying durability. In this sense, a politics of hostility as 
a dominant form does not pretend to ignore practices that give an account of other 
categories such as so-called “selective hospitality”, targeting specific national groups. 
2 The author uses “struggles for movement” in the sense proposed by Papadopoulos and Tsianos (2013), 
Martignoni and Papadopoulos (2014), and Tazzioli (2015).
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In analytical terms, it is not a matter of opposing one with the other but 
understanding their connections and mutual constitution. Similarly, by assuming that 
migration and border control practices are heterogeneous, changing, and dynamic, I 
seek to examine their configuration in relational terms, that is, avoid isolating a practice 
from the set of practices directed at regulating migration and borders. Although the 
focus is on detention and deportation practices, the intent is to understand them 
from their relationship with other control practices in certain contexts and specific 
circumstances. Furthermore, to more fully understanding the exercise of migration 
and border control, attention is given to how the actors strategically use space and 
time while producing certain spatialities and temporalities from their actions. Authors 
of critical migration and border studies with diverse disciplinary origins have drawn 
attention to the relevance of the space/time interrelation and to the spatial and 
temporal categories to understand the functioning of the border regimes and the 
crucial role that borders play in the control of movement (Bigo, 2010; Conlon et al., 
2017; Griffiths et al., 2013; Khosravi, 2014; McNevin, 2019; Mezzadra & Neilson, 2017; 
Tazzioli, 2018).
This article uses material from fieldwork carried out in different periods between 
mid-2013 and the end of 2019. The fieldwork began when deportation and migration 
control practices, in general, were not considered a significant research topic and 
had not gained much public visibility or exposure in Argentina3. Even in the migrant 
activism circles that I frequented, they did not constitute a priority in collective actions. 
The time interval between the invisibility of the deportations and the appearance of 
measures such as the initiative of creating a detention center for foreigners with a 
deportation order and the reform of the migration and citizenship law —which 
contributed decisively to reinstating the topic of deportation in the public debate— 
was fundamental to understanding the transformations in the field of migration 
policies in terms of a “politics of hostility” and evoking the need to speak of a “politics 
of deportation” and not only of deportation practices.
During these years, I conducted several interviews with migrants of different 
nationalities, met or contacted from occasional encounters, shared social or political 
spaces, and personal ties. I also held conversations and interviews with representatives 
of migrant and social organizations and employees, technicians, and government 
officials of the National Directorate of Immigration during the administration of 
Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (2007-2015) and Mauricio Macri (2015-2019). 
In all cases, the interviewee selection criteria were based on the formal link or 
experiences related to the policies or practices under study. In order to reconstruct 
specific processes and events, it was necessary to use bibliographic, newspaper, 
and audiovisual documentary sources of various kinds: journalistic notes, working 
papers and yearbooks of civil organizations, statements by groups or networks of 
organizations, institutional statements, official press releases, national regulations, 
3 This statement does not intend to ignore research carried out at that time, which addressed the issue of 
deportations in the recent Argentinian context. The dissertation of García (2013), for example, on the new 
migration policy in Argentina, is worthy of note.
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verbal testimonies, and public discussions. I also used his archive built during the 
last seven years, which gathers newspaper material and official documents linked 
with migration and border control and detentions and deportations in various South 
American countries.
The “Politics of Hostility”
A politics of hostility condenses multiple practices and representations of actors whose 
actions bring about the criminalization and securitization of migration and borders. 
These are openly hostile actions, originating from government and media sectors that 
have produced collective states of unease, fear, and dread among migrants. Some 
national groups are often exposed or affected by individual narratives, initiatives, 
or measures that associate migration with criminality or delinquency. A politics of 
hostility is imbued with a spectacularization of migration and border control4 to 
capture public attention through the dissemination of statements and images related 
to the strengthening of border control, the hardening of migration policy, the fight 
against “irregular migration”, the intensification of administrative and police controls 
in various social spaces, and the detention and deportation of “criminal aliens”. 
Simultaneously, a politics of hostility sheds light on a series of political decisions and 
administrative and legislative measures, which have received greater or lesser public 
attention, making the daily lives of various sectors or groups of the migrant population 
more precarious or difficult.
In the current context, two government measures are examples of this politics 
of hostility: first, the announcement of the creation of a detention center and, a 
few months later, the signing of the Necessity and Urgency Decree (Spanish: 
Decreto de Necesidad de Urgencia, dnu) No. 70, which modified Migration Law No. 
25.871 and introduced a substantial change to Citizenship Law No. 346. Organized 
migrant activists challenged both of these measures, as illustrated later in this 
article, particularly activists from organizations with a long history of promoting 
and defending migrants’ rights in Argentina and those concerning new spaces and 
networks of migrant and social organizations. It is necessary to understand these 
two measures as part of a broader process of producing hostility toward migrants: 
exponential increase of controls on permanence; institutional persecution and 
violence toward migrant street vendors; bills aimed at restricting access to health 
and higher education; increase in deportations and deportation orders; information 
campaigns against “irregular migration” on social networks; creation of a digital 
application for the security forces to control “irregularity;” exponential increase of 
migration rates; temporary extension of the requirement for criminal records; and 
4 The notion of the “spectacularization” is used here following De Genova (2013), who speaks of “specta-
cles of migrant ‘illegality’”. These “spectacles” confer visibility on migrant “illegality”.
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implementation of a remote electronic system for residence procedures that caused 
enormous difficulties and delays for migrants.
A politics of hostility involves much more than hostile actions or episodes of 
hostility against migrants in a particular social context. It recognizes a heterogeneity 
of practices that combine historical constructions about migrants as illegitimate 
presence, anomaly, or exteriority (Sayad, 2008), associated with illegality, deportability, 
dangerousness, or criminality with new narratives about security and protection. A 
politics of hostility supposes a twofold movement as a product of migration and border 
criminalization and securitization processes. On the one hand, it makes out specific 
individuals or groups to be a threat, danger, or risk. On the other hand, it seeks to 
provide protection or security to the rest of society or those established as victims. The 
figure of the delinquent or criminal foreigner as a deportable subject is intrinsic to 
the politics of hostility produced in recent years. It is mobilized as a way of disciplining 
all migrants. Here, as indicated by Basok (2019), the dnu can be interpreted as a 
disciplinary technique directed at deterring or preventing, under threat of detention 
and deportation, participating in protests, resisting the authorities, or engaging in 
informal or illegal economic activities.
A decade after the Migration Law’s approval, the association between migration, 
crime, and security was reestablished as the dominant representation through the 
“criminal alien”. In 2014, the deportation of foreigners and the control of migration, 
in a pre-electoral context marked by the discussion on “public safety”, became relevant 
in the public debate once more. The Secretary of Security, Sergio Berni, appeared in 
front of the cameras in several episodes in which migrants or foreigners were accused of 
being criminals, demanding their deportation. Many other leaders of different political 
parties expressed themselves in the same vein. In the context of the reform of the 
National Code of Criminal Procedure (nccp), the presidential announcement established 
a direct link between foreigners and crime, in addition to justifying the modification of 
one of the articles based on the “protection that we Argentinians deserve”. The Center 
for Legal and Social Studies (Spanish: Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales, cels), one 
of the human rights organizations with the most significant influence on migration 
policies, undertook various actions that questioned the introduction of the “expulsion 
of foreigners” in the bill and advocated eliminating the article in question5. In this 
context, some concerns and fears about their precarious immigration status and their 
deportability began to emerge among migrant families in working-class neighborhoods. 
With the nccp reform project already started in congress, the Secretary of Security 
once again made statements about “foreign criminals” and the need to deport them 
from the country. In these circumstances, the National Director of Immigration, 
Martín Arias Duval, distanced himself from the Secretary of Security statements and 
the presidential position in the context of the reform of the nccp. However, a few 
weeks later, the National Directorate of Immigration (ndi) approved one of the 
5 cels presents in detail its arguments against Article 35 of the document “Proposals and observations on 
the reform of the National Code of Criminal Procedure” (November 2014).
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measures that generated the most unrest among migrant and social organizations: 
the procedure in case of justified suspicion in the tourist subcategory, a figure better 
known as the “false tourist”, whose background goes back to the 1980s6.
These crossovers between national officials demonstrate that a politics of hostility 
can also be a product of the struggles between competing government sectors to 
monopolize migration control. This competition feeds the securitization process of 
migration. At times it is possible to notice that some institutional activities and certain 
statements by government officials in the media respond to the interests and strategies 
they deploy in the face of the confrontations they maintain to develop their political 
projects or survive bureaucratic restructuring. Thus, the “false tourist” procedure in 
2014 was part of the disputes between the ndi, as an agency of the Ministry of Interior, 
and the Ministry of Security. The differences between the National Director of the 
ndi, Martín Arias Duval, and the Secretary of Security, Sergio Berni, were because 
of this situation. The disputes between these two government sectors reoccurred, 
with different connotations, in the following administration. The initiative to create 
the detention center, which existed before the new leadership of the ndi, was part 
of the struggle to transfer the ndi to the Ministry of Security. For a long time, there 
were multiple rumors about the transfer of this agency to the security sector. In the 
end, this never materialized. According to some interviews with key actors, the dnu, 
which was created within the ndi, contributed to keeping the agency in charge of 
migration within the sphere of the Ministry of Interior. These battles were part of the 
securitization process of migration during the administration of Mauricio Macri.
Finally, although the figure of the criminal foreigner is central to the production of a 
politics of hostility, for its legitimization, it requires a counterpart: a politics of selective 
hospitality. As demonstrated by the recent experience of several South American 
countries, narratives justifying control do not just exploit the migrant or foreign figure 
as a criminal or delinquent but simultaneously work on the division between desirable 
and undesirable migrants. The presence of the “good migrant” is celebrated and the 
arrival of the “criminal foreigner” is rejected at the same time that, in a nationalist 
key, the opening or the closing of the “doors” to the country is postulated for those 
who would come to produce, work, or study in contrast to those who would arrive to 
commit crimes. Thus, official bodies propose residence facilities for the former and 
detention, deportation, or border rejection for the latter. This aspect became evident 
in the current Argentinian context with the high visibility that Senegalese, Haitian, 
and Venezuelan migration acquired. On the one hand, Senegalese street vendors have 
been subjected to various criminalization practices, persecution, and police violence 
in different urban contexts. On the other hand, the more significant influx of Haitian 
nationals in the leading international airports of Argentina generated a great deal of 
6 By applying this procedure, the migration control agents decide on the admission of a foreigner suspec-
ted of intending to enter or remain in the national territory or to obtain a “tourist” visa, without the “real 
intention” of carrying out a “rest” or “leisure” activity. In the case of “justified suspicion”, the inspector must 
notify the supervisor, who will decide on the “rejection of the foreigner”. In the case of rejection, “redirec-
tion”, as it is known in administrative jargon, takes place. For an analysis of the figure of the “false tourist” 
in Argentina, see Alvites Baiadera (2018).
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speculation among migration authorities about their possible intentions and behaviors. 
This suspicion at the migration control posts at the airports translated into a systematic 
practice of selectivity: in a few months, there was an exponential increase in rejections 
at the border based on the category of “false tourists”. At the same time, Venezuelan 
nationals arriving in Argentina were favored by “humanitarian” measures.
Detention
In August 2016, the ndi communicated through its website that it had signed an 
agreement with the National Ministry of Security and the Ministry of Justice and 
Security of the city of Buenos Aires  to avail of a building destined for “people detained 
for infractions of the Migration Law”. It was a statement “against migration irregularity”, 
and it announced the upcoming opening of a detention center for migrants with a 
deportation order. This measure was in line with the punitive and police vision of 
migration that the statements of government officials and the intensification of daily 
control practices had demonstrated in previous months. Nevertheless, this official 
vision did not respond only to a particular conception about migration regulation 
but also involved struggles between different State agencies that explained, in part, 
one of the dimensions of the securitization process of migration in the Argentinian 
context. Thus, the Ministry of Security expressed a particular interest in extending its 
sphere of intervention and taking over migration affairs. Furthermore, according to 
some testimonies gathered in formal and informal exchanges with ndi officials, the 
idea of creating the detention center had circulated in the last years of the previous 
administration; however, it was discarded in the end7. In its argumentative strategy, 
based on the confrontation with organizations that defend the rights of migrants, 
the ndi also used in its favor the recommendations made by civil organizations about 
places of detention in the alternative report presented in previous years before the 
Committee on the Protection of the Rights of all Migrant Workers and Members of 
their Families8.
However, through the agreement, not only was the property handed over, but the 
security forces would also be in charge of the daily administration of the detention 
center. Specifically, under the Ministry of Security as Auxiliary Immigration Police, the 
Federal Police would be responsible for “the guard, custody, and security of detained 
foreigners”, in addition to dealing with transfers. Based on the criticism and pressured 
received, the securitization strategy turned toward the humanitarian: The Red Cross 
7 The formal interview took place in October 2016 in the city of Buenos Aires, together with Janneth Clavijo.
8 Alternative report for the Committee on the Protection of the Rights of all Migrant Workers and Members 
of their Families. 15th session. Evaluation on Argentina, cels/Caref/UNLA, 2011. In this document, one 
of the issues noted was that the was no “structure” in the country that could “be used by the migration 
authority and judges who issue detention orders, in accordance with the mandates established in the law 
and the regulations”.
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would assume the functions initially intended for the Federal Police. The appearance of 
this international organization in the field of humanitarianism on the national scale was 
evidence of the transnational dimension of the migration and border control processes. 
Thus, the project of creating a “detention center” expresses the local materialization 
of a global expansion process of detention as an unprecedented way of governing 
migration (De Genova, 2016), which institutes new spatialities and temporalities of 
migration and border control. In some countries such as Australia, the Red Cross 
has been in charge of monitoring migrant detention centers, under “humanitarian” 
precepts, for more than twenty years. In an interview with an ndi official in 2018, one 
of the arguments with which he tried to support the opening of the detention center 
and minimize its punitive connotation pointed at the role of the Red Cross and its 
humanitarian character as a guarantee of protection for the detainees9.
A detention center is a centerpiece in producing a politics of deportation since it 
makes official the practices of detention and expulsion from the national territory. Due 
to its material and symbolic implications, the agreement between the ndi, the National 
Ministry of Security, and the Ministry of Justice and Security of the city of Buenos Aires 
as an act of institution (Bourdieu, 1999a) of detention was a crucial element in the 
reconfiguration process of the control regime of migrant “illegality” in current times. 
“Irregular migrants”, who as non-nationals are intrinsically deportable, also become 
detainable subjects, deprived of “ambulatory freedom”, which creates a new spatialities 
of control. This confinement also acquires a particular temporality: this is a detention, 
as the agreement says, “for the reasonable and necessary time to fulfill the purposes and 
scope set by the migration authority”. In the migration control sphere, the practice of 
detention demonstrates the most evident relationship with time: waiting (Griffiths et 
al., 2013). In the case of administrative detention, the migration authority exercises its 
power by depriving people of their mobility and making them wait, using their time: the 
prolonged waiting for deportation means not being in-time with others (Khosravi, 2014)10. 
Therefore, seen from state power, waiting is a delay, a multi-use practice of controlling 
people’s movement. Detention stops being exceptional to become routine, mundane, 
even inevitable (De Genova, 2016). Although the concept of detention is concomitant 
to any act of deportation, in a space destined specifically for “irregular” migrants as 
“detainees”, through its daily use it produces a new spatialities of control that reaffirms 
illegalization, gives a material form to the “irregular” migrant, and the deprivation of 
ambulatory freedom becomes proof of his/her social dangerousness.
The official announcement also reactivated the circles of migrant activism. A week 
after the announcement of the ndi, the organizations for the defese of migrants´ 
9 This interview was held in the office of a regional delegate of the ndi in August 2018.
10 In this brief text, Khosravi reflects on the meaning of waiting for “undocumented” migrants, asylum 
seekers, and other displaced people. On this occasion he makes use of the analysis by Bourdieu (1999b) 
about time in his book Pascalian Meditations.
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human rights had already spoken out against the creation of the detention center11. 
In general, explicitly or implicitly, they opposed or rejected its creation and demanded 
respect for migrants’ human rights. The reasons were based on the linking of migration 
and crime, the treatment of migration as a “security problem”, and the violation of 
migrants’ human rights. They also demanded regularization as an urgent response to 
“irregularity” and vigorously defended the Migration Law and the national migration 
policies’ human rights approach. Among the announcements, one of them invoked the 
most effective slogan at the international level in the fight against the criminalization 
of migration: “No human being is illegal”. In the course of the week, an international 
human rights organization also appeared, which until then had not been present in the 
disputes over the political definition of migration in Argentina: Amnesty International 
expressed its concern and stated its opposition to the use of detention as “a form of 
punishment or deterrence” (Amnistía Internacional, 2016, August 26).
In this conflict between the government and social organizations, the project to 
create a detention center came into prominence and became a “controversy:” On 
the same day that several organizations demonstrated against the detention center, 
the most widely circulated press in the country dedicated some articles to the issue. 
In one of the national newspapers, an article entitled “A prison for foreigners” read: 
“Beyond euphemisms, it will be the first prison for migrants in the country” (Abrevaya, 
2016, August 2016). In the following days, the national subdirector of the ndi 
responded through a statement entitled “False controversy about supposed ‘prison’ for 
immigrants”. It sought to disprove that the government would criminalize migration by 
creating a detention center and argued against the appellation of “prison”. Over the 
following months, the struggle of the organizations against the center incorporated 
the notion of “prison” to symbolize xenophobia and state violence against migrants. 
In retrospect, the ndi official intended to discuss a political claim on a technical level 
beyond legal clarifications and technicalities. In their argument in favor of the center, 
they appealed to the notion of “protection”, a common resource for legitimizing 
security practices: The center was supposedly designed to “provide greater protection 
and comfort” to detained foreigners “during the time it took for their departure to 
their place of origin”.12 Numerous social organizations did not take long in questioning 
these statements and were intransigent about the initiative. In those days, “academics, 
activists, and migrants” who identified with the defense of migrant rights launched 
a campaign against the detention center and promoted the signing of a petition 
entitled “No to the creation of detention centers for migrants in Argentina”. Since its 
announcement in 2016, the detention center has never been inaugurated.
11 In the days following the announcement, the program on Immigration and Asylum of the Universidad 
Nacional de Lanús (unla), cels, Argentinian Commission for Refugees and Migrants (Spanish: Comisión 
Argentina para Refugiados y Migrantes, caref), Office of the Ombudsman of the City of Buenos Aires, 
Amnesty International, and Andhes spoke out.
12 National Directorate of Migration (2016, August 29). False controversy on supposed “prison” for mi-
grants. Buenos Aires.
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Deportation
During 2016, several announcements promised a tightening of migration policy. The 
initiative to create a detention center in the city of Buenos Aires had already alerted 
migrant rights organizations to the punitive character of the upcoming state measures. 
However, the responses of the ndi officials to the various consultations they made 
through formal and informal channels regarding the modification of the Migration 
Law did not seem to augur a measure that would reinforce the punitive and coercive 
aspects of the law. The Executive directly denied that there was a project to repeal 
or modify it. In various spaces and meetings of migrant activism, this possibility was 
frequently addressed. The law reform was drawn up in absolute secrecy. In January 
2017, the national government issued a dnu, citing a critical security situation. As 
stated by Basok (2019), the notion of “crisis” was mobilized to justify an exceptional 
measure that would supposedly alleviate the current situation. The dnu modified the 
migration law under fallacious arguments that sought to show the close relationship 
between migration and “organized crime” to justify the strengthening of the detention 
and deportation procedures. The dnu was the most significant act of the politics of 
deportation taking shape, and it hegemonized the symbolization of the criminalization 
of migration13. Over time, this measure led to an increase in deportations. However, 
above all, it (re)activated deportability among various migrant groups by multiplying 
deportation orders and different daily control practices. Like the agreement to create 
the detention center, the dnu was an act of officialization of a regular state action, 
which due to the criticisms, tensions, or conflicts it can trigger, is often hidden. 
Unlike the limited impact of some control measures that go mostly unnoticed because 
they operate in the field of humanitarianism or electronic surveillance, the explicit 
violence of detention and deportation subjects governments to the scrutiny of local 
and international actors and can occasionally lead to collective mobilizations.
In the context of a politics of hostility, with the initiative to create the detention 
center in 2016 and dnu No. 70 in 2017, struggles were reactivated, and migrant 
activism spaces reorganized. The cancellation of the dnu became the pivotal point of 
the migrant struggles during the following two years, which reactivated the memory of 
the collective struggles based on mobilizations in support of migrants as understood 
by Tazzioli (2020): the temporality of solidarity. The fight against the dnu meant that 
migrant rights organizations recovered the practical knowledge acquired over the years, 
developed different advocacy strategies, activated their national and international 
networks, established alliances with new actors, and formed new work and discussion 
13 Although this section focuses on the concept of deportation, it is necessary to mention that dnu No. 70 
modified the requirements for access to Argentinian nationality by excluding the possibility that the requi-
red years of residency be considered regardless of the administrative situation of the applicant. The dnu 
now states that foreigners must prove their residence as “permanent residents” or “temporary residents”. 
This modification is a clear manifestation of the reconfiguration of the control regime of migrant “illegality”.
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spaces. In this context, based on a specific deportation measure, there emerged the 
most representative figure of the campaign for the repeal of the dnu, which gained 
many followers: Vanessa Gómez Cueva, a Peruvian woman who had been living in 
Argentina for more than 15 years, who in early 2019 was deported with her baby and 
separated from her other two young children as a result of a criminal case for which 
she had served her sentence in 201414. Her removal from national territory became 
a symbol of the regressive policy of the national government regarding the human 
rights of migrants that the organizations sought to denounce. Somehow, it was to be 
expected that, in an openly hostile context toward migrants, in which deportation 
was included as a demonstration of the State’s sovereign power, an emblematic figure 
would be produced. These emblematic figures illuminate the tension between the 
practices of control and those of opposition: they are the product of the conflicts 
and confrontations between political or security professionals and activists from social 
organizations. Moreover, in the heterogeneous universe of migrant activism, these 
figures produce cohesion beyond the differences and disagreements about the means 
of struggle.
In Argentina, the politics of hostility of the 1990s also had a representative figure: 
Juan Carlos de la Torre, a Uruguayan citizen who was summarily deported after living 
22 years in Argentina. At that time, in a context of open criminalization of migration 
from neighboring countries, the practices of persecution, detention, and deportation 
were also justified as part of the fight against “illegal migration”. The case of Juan Carlos 
de la Torre was one of the most important lawsuits in the history of cels. In a context 
of institutional reconversion and professionalization of legal work, litigation before 
international bodies became an effective internationalization strategy to influence 
national migration policies. In 1999, cels presented a petition on his behalf before 
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (iachr). In addition to other 
international actions, the claim and the amicable settlement reached before the iachr 
were part of the strategy in the fight for the repeal of the migration law passed during 
the last military dictatorship (cels, 2008, 2013). Given that the amicable settlement 
reached shortly after the new law’s approval, the Argentinian State committed itself to 
protect migrants’ rights more broadly. This case also became a fundamental precedent 
for future international claims.
The gradual diversification of the field of migrant activism condenses multiple 
spatialities and temporalities of migrant struggles in Argentina. In the “struggles 
for rights” (Caggiano, 2011), particularly at times of open hostility toward migrants 
from official bodies, organizations of different types carried out specific actions and 
invented spaces that did not last for long: whether because they fulfilled their purpose, 
14 An important aspect of the case of Vanessa Gómez Cueva, which cannot be gone into here due to lack of 
space, concerns the political effectiveness of the campaign based on her status as a woman and a mother. 
Her case and the arguments used against her deportation provide various elements for the discussion of 
the legitimization and normalization of deportation based on the division between those who deserve or do 
not deserve such punishment (Cfr. Lecadet, 2018; Walters, 2018a).
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did not have the necessary funding or participation to sustain them, they merged 
with other initiatives, or conflicts of interests and views affected their viability. Other 
collective organization experiences gave rise to spaces and links relatively stable over 
time and favored the development of advocacy strategies at the local and international 
levels. Since the dnu was issued in early 2017, there has been a reorganization in the 
universe of migrant activism, with important agreements and convergences between 
organizations of diverse types, beyond the expected differences and disputes in 
collective construction spaces. Some social organizations carried out various actions 
of encounter, mobilization, and street protest as part of a campaign called “Migration 
is not a crime”, with the slogan “Migration is a right”15. On the other hand, with 
the slogan of “coordinated activism”, as cels calls it, human rights organizations, 
civil associations, migrant organizations, and research centers at public universities 
established new alliances. In turn, some of the migrant rights organizations, such as 
cels and Caref, called on their extensive experience and expertise in fighting for the 
repeal of the dnu. In addition to bringing the matter to the national courts, their 
fight against the dnu included an internationalization strategy that had already been 
effective in the past. On other occasions, cels and Caref, together with other national 
and international organizations, had already turned to bodies of the inter-American 
human rights system and the United Nations’ system to influence local policy.
Based on the experience of cels in international litigation, the organizations sought 
the intervention of the iachr to involve and exercise pressure on the Argentinian 
government. At the request of a group of organizations, the iachr summoned the 
Argentinian State to a hearing regarding the changes introduced to the migration law 
by the dnu. At the hearing, the representatives of the four organizations presented 
their arguments against the dnu and requested its annulment. The Argentinian State 
officials sought to justify the measure with a harmonizing notion of the relationship 
between control and human rights. For their part, the iachr commissioners expressed 
their “extreme concern” about the regression of the Argentinian migration policy in 
protecting migrant rights. Later, a larger group of organizations made a presentation 
to the iachr in which they reported the deportations that the Argentinian State was 
carrying out, among other issues. Beyond deportation statistics and legal arguments, 
among so many other issues not considered in the deportation decisions, there is one 
that is fundamental for those who experience it: the removal of time lived or what 
Khosravi (2018) calls “stolen time”. Vanessa Gómez Cueva had lived more than 15 
years in the country before her deportation. Khosravi intentionally uses the notion 
of stealing to highlight the fact that migrants are deprived of the time they have saved, 
spent, and invested. In this way, he intends to repoliticize “the concepts of borders and 
deportations that have been naturalized and depoliticized by the ideology of the nation 
state” (Khosravi, 2018, p. 41). The campaign against her deportation was effective 
15 See Rho (2020) on the new configurations of migrant struggles in Argentina between the years 2016 
and 2019.
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and made the State return part of the “stolen time” to Vanessa Gómez Cueva: seven 
months after her deportation, the ndi lifted the re-entry ban based on “exceptional 
humanitarian reasons” so that she could return to Argentina16.
As has happened in other national contexts where the migration issue has been 
involved in securitization processes, the dnu represented the blurring of the line 
between migrant law and criminal law in Argentina. This phenomenon, known as 
crimmigration (Stumpf, 2006), has been analyzed in some South American countries 
such as Chile (Brandariz et al., 2018). In Argentina, some recent publications have 
analyzed the changes in national migration policy carried out by the political coalition 
of the “new right” led by President Macri. They have also analyzed thoroughly and in 
detail the context of the creation of the dnu, the modifications it introduced to the 
Migration Law, and its implications for migrant rights (Canelo et al., 2018; cels, 2017; 
García & Nejamkis, 2018; Monclús Masó, 2017; Penchaszadeh & García, 2018). These 
works demonstrate that the duration of the administrative and legal processes was a 
central aspect of the reform carried out. The modifications made eloquently indicate 
the transformation that the temporalities of the migration and border control regimes 
are experiencing. Thus, the dnu is an expression of the importance that time, and 
time management have on the exercise of state control over migration and borders. At 
the same time, it sheds light on the struggles among various actors over the definition 
of its temporal dimension. The specificity of the temporality of deportation comes 
from the combination between the infinite prolongation in time of the deportation 
order due to its lack of an expiration date and the disputes about the possibilities of 
limiting or extending the time limits of the procedure. The discussion about time and 
the temporalities of migration and border control has received substantial theoretical 
contributions in recent critical literature (Griffiths et al., 2013; Mezzadra & Neilson, 
2017; Tazzioli, 2018). For the analysis of the temporality of control, the difference 
established by Tazzioli (2018) between time as an object of mechanisms of control 
(“control over time”) and time as a means and technology for managing migration 
(“control through time”) is productive for the analysis of the specificities of the dnu.
The question of time is a central aspect of migration control and the carrying out of 
deportations. According to Tazzioli (2018), it is about control over time. The dnu refers 
to the duration and deadlines of the administrative procedures and legal proceedings 
on migration issues, which would be too long and would not adjust to a criterion of 
reasonability. According to the migration authority, the excessive length of time of 
“a complex recursive procedure” would have brought to the national state “severe 
difficulties in enforcing expulsion orders issued against people of foreign nationality”. 
Consequently, the dnu seeks to establish a shortening of time, a reduction of deadlines 
through the implementation of a “special migratory procedure of a summary 
character” for foreigners who have been part of criminal acts and have entered “in a 
clandestine manner into the national territory, eluding migration control”. Similarly, 
it seeks to increase the duration of the detainment procedure and reduce the time of 
16 National Directorate of Migration (2019, August 30). Provision No. 3.767. Buenos Aires.
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the recursive channels to make the administrative procedure “faster”, that is, increase 
the tempo. In short, the dnu seeks to regulate the temporality of the act of deportation 
by compressing the duration of the procedure and the time limits set for the defense, 
increasing the speed of the whole deportation process. Reducing the time of the 
recursive channels to a minimum and increasing the time of detainment reveal with 
greater starkness the arbitrariness and the violence of this state act.
The indication in the dnu about the difficulties that the national migration 
authorities have in enforcing deportations is an indicator of the struggles being 
waged in the field of migration control and, in particular, in the realm of the 
judiciary. These “severe difficulties” result from a historical antagonism instituted 
through different conflicts between various state actors. In Argentina, since 2010, the 
Migration Law’s regulatory decree has entrusted the Public Ministry of Defense with the 
legal representation of migrants in the case of denial of entry or expulsion from the 
national territory. With the modification introduced by dnu No. 70, the migration law 
would guarantee free assistance in administrative procedures, but it must be expressly 
requested. In September 2018, I held a meeting with two professionals from the Public 
Ministry of Defense. There, one of the defense attorneys made a statement that made 
it possible to begin to see that the dnu viewed cases through the prism of time: through 
what they  call “interposition of resources”, migrants “gain time”. Extending time by 
filing appeals is part of the strategy of defense attorneys. The passing of time has legal 
effects, modifying legal relationships. Time is a valuable asset, and its accumulation 
can change the defended migrants’ situation to benefit from it. Thus, a struggle is 
established for the control of time, which defines the temporalities of deportation 
in different contexts and situations: migrant authorities invent measures to shorten 
the time of the deportation procedure, seeking to influence the time limits of the 
recursive channels, while defense attorneys generate strategies to lengthen it. The 
recurrent visits by ndi officials to judges and prosecutors to influence their decisions 
make sense in the context of these disputes.
Border Rejection 
In 2013, after the celebration of Migrant Day at the central plaza of the city of Córdoba, 
I went to lunch at a Peruvian restaurant on the invitation of the president of the Union 
of Migrant Communities of Córdoba (Spanish: Unión de Colectividades de Inmigrantes 
de Córdoba, ucic). Here, I met a young Colombian man who was in Córdoba to study 
and work. During the conversation, I remembered some Colombian nationals rejected 
at the frontier when trying to enter Argentina and asked him if he knew of any. He 
spoke of his border crossing from Peru to Chile. Along the way, he spent a few days in 
Arica, where a friend lived who worked in an ngo (non-governmental organization) 
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that assisted migrants and had spoken with some of them. He explained that it was 
necessary to have a residence in the country to enter with no problems. Without 
documentation that certified residence in Argentina, entry presented more significant 
difficulties since the control was then stricter. As an alternative, some chose to enter 
Argentina through Bolivia because they were less likely to be rejected at the border.
In May 2014, I met one of the principal figures of the Haitian community in 
Córdoba. It had been three years since he had arrived in the city. In our first meeting, 
he spoke of the difficulties Haitian nationals faced to enter and reside in Argentina. He 
explained that they did not need a visa to enter, but they were still “returned”, that they 
“returned” several Haitian men and women every week. In the case of his brother, who 
had arrived in Córdoba just a few days before, they kept him apart and interrogated 
him for four hours at Ezeiza. Although he had missed his flight, he could continue 
that same day to Córdoba. Soon after, I met an ndi advisor and asked him about the 
border rejections. Some episodes with Haitian nationals at the frontier with Bolivia 
and Colombian nationals at the frontier with Chile had come to light. He explained 
that they were orders “from above”, referencing both the Ministry of Interior and the 
Presidency. At the end of 2014, I met in Brasilia with a migration policy specialist, with 
whom I had maintained a bond of trust for several years. Among other issues, we spoke 
about the border rejections at the airport in Quito. Employees and migrant officials had 
told him that they handled “migration profiles” to detect “false tourists” at the border 
control points. They used a series of criteria based on specific characteristics of the 
foreigners that they learned through “instruction courses”. Haitian nationals were the 
most affected by this type of control by border agents. After a while, when in 2018, the 
rejections at the airport in Córdoba became recurrent, these isolated conversations and 
exchanges began to take on other meanings and another dimension. Those rejections 
occurring at Argentina’s land and air borders reflected recent transformations in the 
South American migration and border regime17.
Border closures, stranded migrants, detentions, deportations, border rejections, 
humanitarian visas, and protests in public spaces became frequent manifestations 
of the changes that South American migration and border control policies were 
experiencing. The various border conflicts that arose from the incursion of new 
movements and border crossings associated with “irregularity” were represented by 
national and international bureaucracies as “migration crises” within the framework 
of action and thought schemes associated with the “governance” of migration flows. In 
a few years, “extra-regional” migration convulsed the scene of cross-border mobilities 
and became a major political issue. Since the early 2010s, the turbulence generated by 
migration from various Asian and African countries and the Caribbean —particularly 
Haiti and Cuba—, has disrupted the institutional arrangements of the South American 
migration and border regime. These moments, which had not gone unnoticed by the 
migration authorities of different national governments during previous years, quickly 
became a matter of regional interest when they began to notice their expansion and 
“irregular” character.
17 See Domenech (2019) on the South American migration and border regime.
18Domenech, E. / The “politics of hostility” in Argentina: detention, expulsion and border rejection
Estudios Fronterizos, vol. 21, 2020, e057 e-ISSN 2395-9134
The expansion of “extra-regional migration” in the South American region as a new 
and recent phenomenon gave rise to various struggles for a movement that involved 
Caribbean and African migrants as illegalized and racialized subjects. The dispersion of 
Haitian migrants in the region increased considerably after the entry into force of the 
visa exemption in Ecuador in 2008, the earthquake in Haiti in 2010, and the changes 
in the admission policy of French Guiana in 2012. These transformations in the South 
American region derived from struggles for movement had a fundamental impact on 
the renewal of the uses and justifications of the consular visa requirement to prevent 
movement from the places of origin and to decrease the arrival of Haitian, Senegalese, 
and Dominican migrants, among other “extra-regionals”. In this context, in 2018, 
after a period that saw an enormous amount of rejections at international airports, 
the governments of Chile and Argentina began to demand, almost simultaneously, 
a consular visa for Haitian citizens under the pretext of a humanitarian narrative of 
protection for the migrant population (Cfr. Trabalón, 2018). Similarly, in Chile, as a 
complementary measure to the consular visa, the national government organized, with 
the support of the International Organization for Migration (iom), a “humanitarian 
plan of orderly return” aimed explicitly at illegalized Haitian migrants (Cfr. Stang et 
al., 2020). This action was justified by “the national interest of providing the country 
with an orderly, safe, and regular migration” from “a global perspective of migration 
governance”. In Argentina, Haitians’ consular visa requirement was established a year 
and a half after the ndi initiated a migration regularization process “for humanitarian 
reasons” aimed explicitly at Haitian nationality citizens for six months18. The sequence 
reveals the changing and contingent character of control in the face of movement: 
regularization, border rejections, and visa imposition. Going by the statements 
made by officials in the press, it is possible to notice the recurrence of the notions of 
“protection” and “prevention” in the means of legitimizing security measures —the 
visa application process is intended to protect them from becoming victims of human 
trafficking and smuggling, and to prevent possible crimes.
The reasons that migration authorities provided for imposing a visa were the 
“increase in passenger flow” from Haiti and the increasing rejections based on the 
concept of the “false tourist”19. On the day of the official announcement of the 
measure, several media outlets published absolute and relative figures on the entries 
and rejections of Haitian nationals during the previous years and estimates for 2018 
that would support the official argument. However, it is not necessarily the absolute 
quantity of one nationality or its proportion concerning other nationalities that 
determines the activation or deactivation of certain control practices. Instead, it is 
18 National Directorate of Migration (2017, March 20). Provision No. 1.143. Buenos Aires.
19 On August 21, several articles were published in national and regional newspapers that referred to the 
“increase in the flow” of Haitian passengers or migrants. See, for example, “Tourist visa will be required for 
Haitians who want to enter the country”, Clarín, August 21, 2018; “The government imposes a tourist visa 
for Haitians who want to enter the country in order to regulate the entry of migrants”, La Nación, August 
21, 2018.
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the accumulated volume of certain nationalities in a limited space-time interval. In 
these cases, the rejections are related to the speed of people’s movement, expressed 
in the daily, weekly, or monthly growth rate. What counts is not the annual statistics 
the ndi produces but the daily register handled by inspectors, supervisors, and heads 
of regional offices. In turn, the logic of control receives feedback and leads to the 
intervention of agents from various spheres of the State: those in charge of verifying 
the documentation and identification of persons generate “rejections”, and then that 
accumulation of rejections serves as the basis for higher authorities to resolve visa 
imposition “inwards” and negotiate it “outwards” with the diplomatic counterpart. The 
accumulation of “rejections at the border” is not the result of an individual or random 
practice. It is not only an increase in the “flow of passengers”, but of travelers with certain 
pre-established national origins viewed as suspicious or subject to criminalization and 
racialization processes that are concomitant with the border control regimes. In May 
2018, a memorandum from the ndi required staff to “take extreme care with the entry 
of Haitian nationals and any other sensitive nationality (Middle Eastern, Colombian, 
African, among others) to the Republic of Argentina”. It established that “a lack of 
examination or deficient examination” would be considered “major offenses”20. This 
memorandum confirmed the intensification and selectivity of the migration controls 
that were already being experienced by Haitian nationals at airports in Argentina.
Airports have become part of detention geographies (Martin & Mitchelson, 2009) 
and the deportation infrastructure (Walters, 2018b). In Argentina, the country’s main 
airport terminals have adopted biometric technology and adapted their facilities to 
international recommendations for movement control and surveillance. Innovations 
in airport security have led to substantial changes to spatial and temporal control 
practices, which exacerbate the anxieties experienced by travelers who are suspected 
of being “false tourists”. An episode at the airport of the city of Córdoba reveals specific 
details about how the spatialities and temporalities of control are usually experienced 
at the time of entry through confinement, waiting, and separation of individuals or 
groups in a state of total uncertainty. On the night of April 17, 2018, accompanied 
by Jean, I met with Willy, who had arrived in Córdoba from Haiti around two years 
before. Willy was a street vendor. He had the temporary residence he had obtained the 
year before from the migration regularization plan. Ruth, his partner, had just arrived 
from Haiti with their youngest daughter. Both were on the verge of being rejected at 
the border. In the end, after waiting several hours, they were able to enter. Nobody 
could explain the confusing situation they had experienced or what had finally helped 
authorize their entry.
The Copa Airlines flight had landed around 00:30 hours. They got off the plane 
and went to the documentation checkpoints. Haitian women and men —black people, 
emphasized Willy— were made to line up separately from the rest. When Ruth went to 
the checkpoint and presented their passports and the letter of invitation her partner 
20 National Directorate of Migration (2018, May 10). Memorandum No. 192. Buenos Aires.
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had sent her, the inspector asked her to wait right there. She was then taken aside and 
taken to a room where her wait was prolonged. Meanwhile, Ruth communicated via 
WhatsApp with her partner, who was waiting outside with a friend. There were also 
other Haitians waiting there. Hours passed, and no one informed them of anything. It 
was a moment filled with anguish, loneliness, and uncertainty. Furthermore, there was 
no interpreter or inspector who spoke French at the airport. Ruth did not understand 
Spanish; she spoke Creole and French. Since Willy’s friend was better at Spanish, 
he asked to speak to the inspector on the phone to explain the situation. However, 
she refused to do so. Later, an airline employee informed Willy that his partner was 
not being allowed entry due to a (legal) “cause” that he had due to a conflict with a 
municipal agent on a public thoroughfare while selling merchandise.
After a few hours, Ruth and her daughter were taken upstairs and placed in line 
for the next flight: it was only then that she learned they were being sent back to Haiti. 
At one point, an ndi employee came for her and took her and her daughter out of 
the line. Finally, after more than four hours since their airplane had landed, they were 
allowed entry. About ten Haitians were not allowed entry and were sent back. During 
the conversation, I asked Willy how he explained what had happened. He answered, 
smiling, “It is not my country…” Compared to the time when Willy had entered the 
country two years before, he and Jean agreed that it had become more difficult to 
enter now. A friend of Willy’s mentioned an acquaintance who had been rejected at 
the airport the previous Saturday and another who had arrived in Buenos Aires on the 
day of our meeting. During the meeting, I noticed that they were a bit disconcerted: 
they wondered what was necessary to enter and pointed out that the requirements 
were not clear because they were always changing. At times, it seemed that the letter 
of invitation was enough, and at others, it seemed that a hotel reservation would make 
it easier for them to gain entry. Willy’s friend was waiting for his partner’s arrival, who 
had a ticket for May 19. With the increase in border rejections at the airport, he was 
afraid she would not be allowed entry. The ndi memorandum notifying inspectors of 
“sensitive nationalities” such as Haitians was already in circulation.
Final Considerations
Since the approval of the migration law that came into force in early 2004, there has 
seemed to be certain objective complicity between the various actors involved in the 
control of migration and borders to maintain the universe of detentions, deportations, 
and rejections at the border on the plane of the unspoken, the invisible, and the 
exceptional. In addition to the tasks of legitimizing violence carried out by States, 
the omissions and silence surrounding punitive and coercive state actions indicated 
an effective work of concealment. Although in those years, specifically in 2014, there 
were already some indicators of the changes that the field of migration control was 
experiencing, it was difficult to foresee what was to come. Later, the spectacularization 
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of migration and border control, whose deployment was linked to the initiative of 
creating a detention center and the approval of a provision that sought to tighten 
the restrictive and punitive aspects of the current migration law, prompted the 
consideration that, in terms of process, this was the configuration of a politics of 
hostility toward migration. Under this policy, in a regional context that had already 
demonstrated the intensification of state violence toward migrants for some years, 
there was a redefinition and a strengthening of the division between “desirable” and 
“undesirable” migrants, whose most evident manifestation was the figure of the criminal 
foreigner. This article has tried to demonstrate that this politics of hostility was not the 
result of the accumulation or sum of hostile actions and attitudes toward migrants, 
but that it was a specific mode to intervene politically in the field of migration control. 
While its production is base on the migrant “illegality”, the condition ofdeportability, 
determined by the division between nationals and non-nationals, was differentially and 
effectively exploited by state and non-state actors. The politics of hostility also created 
conditions to form new spatialities and temporalities of migration or border control 
and migrant struggles. 
This article aims to contribute to understanding the intensifying process of 
migration control in the Argentinian context in an abbreviated period at different 
scales. These changes are attributable to the actions, strategies, and struggles of 
multiple actors interested in imposing their definition of the things to be done and 
how they should be done. The Argentinian national experience provides numerous 
elements to observe the long-term transformation of the control regime of migrant 
“illegality”, the formation of a politics of deportation, and the overlap between 
securitization practices and humanitarian narratives. These far-reaching processes are 
intertwined with the forms and justifications that control practices acquire in specific 
contexts or situations. In the deployment of a politics of hostility, there were moments 
of the exaltation of punishment or “punitive pride” through the theatricalization 
of detentions and deportations. On the other hand, the exploration of the space 
and time relationship makes it possible to notice transformations in the political 
field of migrations and borders linked with the production of new spatialities and 
temporalities of control: a detention center destined for “irregular” migrants with a 
deportation order; specific waiting places for suspicious travelers at airports; dissimilar 
spatial practices of migrant struggles; measurement of the speed of “migration flows;” 
disputes over the definition of administrative deadlines and waiting periods; delays 
and interruptions in the detention and deportation processes. Finally, the changing 
spatial and temporal character of control demonstrates the need to understand the 
heterogeneity of migration and border control practices in a articulated and relational 
manner, based on the stability or instability demonstrated by the measures that seek to 
facilitate or impede the entry or residential status of one person or others.
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